Following my return from Liberia and the wonderful family get-together in Simi Valley, on Monday the 7th of June, I was road bound again. It was good to be back on the Harley after two weeks. Southern California, however, was anything but warm and sunny as I made my way to the Pacific Coast Highway, although the weather improved as I got out from under the “June gloom” of fog and low-lying clouds that never seem to deposit any rain. After lunch at Pismo Beach, I stopped off at San Simeon and visited the State Historical Monument known as “Hearst Castle” the next morning.

The main quarters of Hearst Castle, with room for 115 guests. Modeled after a 13th century Spanish castle. The Egyptian artifacts are real, and believed to precede the time of Tutankhaman, about 3,500 years.
William Randolph Hearst, the great entrepreneur and newspaper magnate who defined the modern day influence of the media on politics, wanted to be known most as a builder. One of many he had in the U.S. and Europe and the site of his boyhood camping playground, “La Cuesta Encantada” (the Enchanted Hill as Hearst named it) went over to the State of California after his death in 1951 and has been a money-maker since. When I first saw its opulent Mediterranean Revival guest and main houses, its prodigious collection of art and artifacts from mostly Europe and the Middle East, it struck me as the ultimate in self-indulgence by a nouveaux riche American who could afford to spare no expense in materialistic acrobatics. But, as I began to learn more about how Hearst and his chief architect, Julia Morgan, meticulously blended its style with the surrounding land, along with the carefully chosen and placed collection, I couldn’t help but agree with the architectural historian, Lord John Julius Norwich, that “Hearst Castle is a palace in every sense of the word”.

View to the Pacific from Hearst Castle.
Except that I would add it is a truly American palace, for hardly anywhere else could something so entirely new come from something fundamentally old. I had also learned that Hearst, along with many other wealthy Americans such as the Fords, the Carnegies, Gettys, Rockefellers, and so on, collected artifacts and artwork originally obtained from European aristocrats who were broke or under pressure to abandon their belongings for political reasons in the 20’s and 30′s. In this way, a great many treasures were preserved that otherwise might have been looted or destroyed during the Spanish Civil War or World War II.
Although it is common knowledge that wealthy families in the United States, in recognition of their good fortune and what is now called “corporate social responsibility”, have organized and contributed to many charities and foundations, I was not aware of this cultural aspect of their largesse. While the kind of generosity of, for example, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is not unique to the United States and to the rich, this kind of American exceptionalism is still rather trademark and unparalleled in scale. Jon Steinbeck, in his discussion of the nearly endless paradoxes of America and Americans, remarked that “…if we have enough of the gold – we contribute it back to the nation in the form of foundations and charities”. I have often pointed out to many non-Americans that, for every dollar they see in humanitarian or development assistance from the public sector, there is anywhere between two to four times as much donated from the private sector. Most of the largest and most well-established NGOs in the world are headquartered in the U.S. Another characteristic comparative advantage of the United States, particularly in terms of soft power. Much of this has to do with the unique relationship between the individual and the state in America, particularly in the deep-seated distrust of the former in the latter.

The Pacific Coast Highway approaching Big Sur.
During a short interlude as I departed San Simeon to take a look at the elephant seals basking in the sun at Point Piedras Blancas, I met up with another lone biker, a German fellow riding from Florida to San Francisco, and shared the ride with him up the “PCH” as far as my next stop in Monterey. The ride itself posed a dilemma to either look at the magnificent scenery or run my bike off the steep mountainsides than ran directly into the Pacific. It was also ironic to not only have seen my first zebras in the wild in California (and not Africa); additionally, I spoke more German on the West Coast than I had in years, between my extended family in Simi Valley (that is, the original immigrants, as the next generation, in characteristic fulfillment of the American assimilation ethic, hardly spoke enough to order a schnitzel) and running into numerous Central European adventurers looking for a taste of freedom on two wheels.
The stopover in Monterey had three purposes. The first and least important was to take a look around one of California’s most prosperous communities. The second and most important was to enjoy lunch with a dear friend and colleague from the Naval Postgraduate School, one of the rare serious historians on U.S. civil affairs and civil-military operations. She pointed out to me that – beyond the more storied examples of the U.S. military’s involvement in military government and what is now called “stability operations” in Texas before it became a state, during Reconstruction after the Civil War, throughout most of the West as the frontier expanded across the continent in the 19th century, in the Philippines and the Caribbean in the early 20th century, and in Germany and Japan in the wake of World War II – Monterey, California had its own contribution to that history.

California's Consitution Hall in Monterey, which was the first capital of the California Republic until it became a (non-slave) state in 1850.
After the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 to end the war with Mexico, California was under military governance until General Bennett Riley, the seventh military governor, grew impatient with the inability of a Congress obsessed with the balance of slave and non-slave states to form a territorial government. He took the initiative to convene civilian leaders for a constitutional convention in Monterey, serving informally as California’s first capitol. The Constitution, written in both English and Spanish, also enabled what Navy Chaplain Walter Colton (for whom the constitutional hall is named) described as the “fecundity of the Californians” to be exercised in proposition voting – a unique aspect of California politics that persists today. Less than a year later, in September 1850, California joined the Union as the 31st state.
For me, this was just another example of the paradox of the role of the U.S. military in nation-building, dispelling the argumentum of the “warfighter” class in the U.S. military since the first peace operations of the 1990’s that the U.S. military should not do “nation-building” and limit itself to more “traditional” roles such as combat and big wars. With a media (and our political, economic, and cultural elites) now with hardly any military experience or depth of understanding of U.S. history, the common perception in the American public is that the military’s involvement in “stability operations” and nation-building is a new phenomenon. Here again, the notion that the point of reference for U.S. national security engagements is World War II and the Cold War is eclipsed by examples of the military’s involvement in “irregular” operations going back for centuries. In fact, the predominant form of military engagement in U.S. history has been in “small wars” as nicely depicted in Max Boot’s The Savage Wars of Peace.
Thus, one of the main problems with our national security establishment is that it remains dominated by the “military industrial complex” that President Eisenhower warned about, predicated on a big war mentality in a world of small wars, technology obsessed, budget-driven, overwhelmingly focused on major combat, and risk-averse. The controversy, as in so many aspects of U.S. politics, is presented as “either/or” – either we are able fight wars or escort children to kindergartens. It is not, however, been “either/or” but “both” (or in military parlance, full-spectrum operations). Fortunately, policy and doctrine has begun to recognize that. The paradigm, however, has not shifted until it’s reflected as well in budgets, programs, and operations. As anyone in the policy business will tell you, the devil, as always, is in the details.
Some still resist this, based on weak and credible grounds. The more specious, as I’ve heard for some time since the 90’s, is that the rules of engagement in places like Afghanistan are too complex and restrictive for the troops on the ground – he can’t be both a trained killer and a policeman. My answer to that was: try explaining baseball or (American) football to someone unfamiliar with these complex and rules-intensive sports known to most Americans, who incidentally live in one of the world’s most litigious societies. To say the American soldier is unable to grasp such complex rules in the heat of combat is to sell that young person short. What they need, more than the rules, is a greater understanding of the political-military and cultural contexts of their operations. Some like myself have spent a good part of our careers in the field doing just that. American service men and women are always at their best when they understand not what they’re doing as much as why they’re doing it.
(Sports are a good analogy, by the way. For Americans, the world is more like baseball or football – set-piece with clearly define rules and “end states” and points-productive. For the rest of the world, it’s like soccer - highly interpretive, free-flowing, difficult to follow, and often without a clear outcome. Watching the World Cup has hopefully given some Americans more insight into how the rest of the world perceives the international order, although I doubt most have made that connection.)
The more credible reason has to do with risk. Apparently, what seems to be occurring in Afghanistan with respect to the rules of engagement is that, the further down the chain, the more precautions leaders are taking in order not to find themselves in trouble – not with the locals but with their superiors. A good part of this is explainable by the all-pervasive, 24/7 media environment we find ourselves in today, where the margin for error is small and unforgiving. The temptation, therefore, is to error on the side of caution, creating and extremely difficult situation for regular forces and handing over a distinctly great advantage to irregular adversaries.
However, a great deal of this extends from the equally pervasive risk-averse culture the pervades the contemporary U.S. military. I witnessed the development of this during the latter half of my own career, when in the days of the “peace dividend” pursued in the wake of the Cold War, the sharp drawdown of the military forces resulted in the “zero-defects” mentality that I saw at play in the Balkans, when American troops were subjected to byzantine (and often embarrassing) rules for “force protection”, which was Mission Number One for many senior commanders right up to and following 9/11. Many justified this with the image of “Blackhawk Down”, perpetuating the near-myth that, after Somalia in 1992, the American public had no stomach for casualties in the half-wars of that time (and thus substantiating the Pentagon’s resistance to the commitment of American troops to the Balkans, Rwanda or anything else that did not resemble a “real war”). Those were some of the darker days of my career, as I saw that, from a leadership standpoint, the Army did not get better as it got smaller – many who had talent and who were outspoken either left or were forced out among those competing for fewer promotions. In other words, conformity was reinforced – the “yes men” stayed as the military has less room for iconoclasts. Fortunately, some very exceptional leaders still made it to the top, and there are many fine flag officers leading our troops today. Nevertheless, this aspect of the military culture still lingers – and the risk aversion is as much characteristic of career-conscious civilian leadership in, for example, in the State Department.
Throughout all of our government structure involved with foreign and national security policy, military and civilian, we need to emphasis risk management over risk avoidance, give them better tools operate in such environments, and do a better job in our information strategy to inform the constituent public at home and abroad on these risks. The media in particular needs to help explain these issues in greater strategic and historical context, more than they may have felt obligated to do in an earlier time.
Over particularly the last third of my career, it has also become clear to me that, if we are to get the interagency balance right in terms of foreign and national security policy, then we need a fundamental understanding of the civil-military relationship in strategic, operational, and tactical senses, based on the civil-military relationship in American society, as described in the Constitution and throughout U.S. history; namely, that with the possible exception of major combat operations, the military is the supporting agency and the civilian agencies are supported (size does not matter here). Statesman should always take precedence over soldiers. Additionally, the role of the military is as an enabler to those agencies and their activities (such as “nation-building”) in order to work itself out of those (civilian) jobs (which, by the way, have not always been traditionally done by civilian agencies, as USAID, the UN, or NGOs did not exist before World War II).
My (not entirely singular view of civil-military operations) is really an application of the paradoxical concept of deterrence I once heard (to be able to fight in order not to have to): to be able to do nation-building in order not to have to. The concept of civil-military coordination I had put in place in Liberia, also a model for the emerging UN military policy on CIMIC – emphasized that “it’s not about us; it’s about them”, and that “winning hearts and minds” is not the real goal. Rather, civil-military coordination is about managing the interaction between civil and military players and, most importantly, the transition from crisis response and security operations to self-sustained development in such a way that minimized risks and structured local communities and nations as much as possible for success. Teach them how to fish, not give them one (which by the way shows more respect and wins more hearts and minds longer term), and do a few things well rather than everything half-baked, less being more.
One thing that was clear to me in Liberia that will no doubt become even more salient in Afghanistan in the next couple of years – that when international military presence that underpins stability there is leaving, the trick is to shrink potentially destabilizing gaps in self-sustained capacity and confidence before the military’s ability to do this was too insignificant. Security and development or coefficients of each other.

Cannery Row in Monterey, site of one of John Steinbeck's most famous novels.
The third reason to stop in Monterey was to see Cannery Row, the setting of one of the works (of the same name) of John Steinbeck, with Samuel Langhorne Clemens, one of my favorite American fictional writers. From Monterey, I rode to Salinas and stopped in at the Steinbeck Museum, which proved to be very educational. In addition to the insights I had forgotten since the first time I read Travels with Charley (which I have now re-read), much the inspiration for my own journey around America, I learned that Steinbeck had been a war correspondent, resulting in two books that I didn’t know of: Once There Was a War and America and the Americans (which I am now reading).

Next to Mark Twain, Steinbeck is my favorite American fictional writer. This quote was very eye-opening, and prompted me to re-read "Travels with Charley", which I hadn't done since I was a teenager.
As I continued to Pleasanton and took a look at San Francisco, following what I had seen and thought about in Monterey, I began to think about the builders and artists in America, how they have shaped the country, and what that may portend for the future. As I realized while riding through the Southwest, there is a great deal of tension in the United States between them, given that in this commercial republic of pragmatic, results-oriented people, science tends to garner much more socioeconomic status than art. We prefer experts to philosophers.
And yet, the icons of American culture – from the Statue of Liberty to the Golden Gate Bridge (and everything between) reflect the triumph of fusing art and science. This is similarly true of our national security and military culture – our most celebrated military leaders, such as Robert E. Lee and George Patton, were more artists in their trade, as Eisenhower and Marshall were soldier-statesmen. Builders make things; artists make sense of them. Builders bring things to form; artists contextualize them. Builders are conscientious of risk; artists are enamored with opportunity.
Like many things I was reminded of on the Pacific Coast, they go together – not “either/or” but “both”.
Just a few months before my retirement, I came across a remarkable speech by John F. Kennedy given at Amherst after the passing of Robert Frost and less than a month from his own demise. Although I have always felt Americans have neglected the potency of cultural power and the role artists have played and must continue to play if the country is to remain viable and relevant in the world, I could not have articulated now it as well as he did then:
“In America, our heroes have customarily run to men of large accomplishments… The men who create power make an indispensable contribution to the Nation’s greatness, but the men who question power make a contribution just as indispensable, especially when that questioning is disinterested, for they determine whether we use power or power uses us… Our national strength matters, but the spirit which informs and controls our strength matters just as much… When power leads men towards arrogance, poetry reminds him of his limitations. When power narrows the areas of man’s concern, poetry reminds him of the richness and diversity of his existence. When power corrupts, poetry cleanses. For art establishes the basic human truth which must serve as the touchstone of our judgment… The artist, however faithful to his personal vision of reality, becomes the last champion of the individual mind and sensibility against an intrusive society and an officious state.”
And, as did Kennedy:
“I look forward to a great future for America, a future in which our country will match its military strength with our moral restraint, its wealth with our wisdom, its power with our purpose. I look forward to an America which will not be afraid of grace and beauty, which will protect the beauty of our natural environment, which will preserve the great old American houses and squares and parks of our national past, and which will build handsome and balanced cities for our future… I look forward to an America which will reward achievement in the arts as we reward achievement in business or statecraft. I look forward to an America which will steadily raise the standards of artistic accomplishment and which will steadily enlarge cultural opportunities for all of our citizens. And I look forward to an America which commands respect throughout the world not only for its strength but for its civilization as well. And I look forward to a world which will be safe not only for democracy and diversity but also for personal distinction.”